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OUR MILLIAN CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S REPUDIATION OF IMMORALITY AS A
GROUND OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON*
[The function of the criminal law], as we see it, is to preserve public
order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injuri-
ous, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and cor-
ruption of others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable because
they are young, weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of
special physical, official or economic dependence.
It is not, in our view, the function of the law to intervene in the
private lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of
behavior, further than is necessary to cary out the purposes we have
outlined.
* . . Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of
sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which
is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is not to
condone or encourage private immorality.
-The Wolfenden Committee'
* A.B. 1979 (Political Science), The University of Michigan-Flint; M.A.
1983 (History), Wayne State University;J.D. 1983, Wayne State University; M.A.
1985 (Philosophy), The University of Arizona; Ph.D. 1989 (Philosophy), The
University of Arizona; Member, State Bars of Michigan and Arizona; Associate
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, The Uni-
versity of Texas at Arlington. Burgess-Jackson wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on
constitutional interpretation under the supervision ofJoel Feinberg. He is the
author of many works in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy, including
the entry on sodomy in The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia. (Keith Burgess-
Jackson, Sodomy, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 819 (Christo-
pher Berry Gray ed., 1999)). The present essay was written for an audience of
educated, intelligent nonlawyers, not (or notjust) for legal professionals. The
author hopes that this explains its informal-some might say breezy-tone and
style. It is dedicated to the author's beloved teacher, Joel Feinberg, to whom he
owes so much.
1. SIR JOHN WOLFENDEN, COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTI-
TUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 23-24 (Stein and Day 1963) (1957). The
Wolfenden Committee (chaired by Sir John Wolfenden) recommended that
"homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private should no longer
be a criminal offence." Id. at 48.
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The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppres-
sion of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of
private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity. It
is wrong to talk of private morality or of the law not being concerned with
immorality as such or to tiy to set rigid bounds to the part which the law
may play in the suppression of vice. There are no theoretical limits to the
power of the State to legislate against treason and sedition, and likewise I
think there can be no theoretical limits to legislation against immorality.
-Patrick Devlin 2
A little over a century ago, the state of New York enacted a
law that limited the number of hours a baker could work.3 The
law was challenged on the ground that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which forbids
states to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."4 The United States Supreme Court agreed,
ruling, in Lochner v. New York, 5 that the law deprived individuals
of liberty of contract. In his famous dissent in that case, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes drew a distinction between the wisdom
or desirability of a law (on the one hand) and its constitutionality
(on the other):
This case is decided upon an economic theory [viz., laissez-
faire] which a large part of the country does not entertain.
If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making
up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagree-
ment has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various deci-
sions of this court that state constitutions and state laws
may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators
might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as
this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty
to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient exam-
ples. A more modem one is the prohibition of lotteries.
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he
does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same,
which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers,
is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by
every state or municipal institution which takes his money
for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not.
2. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13-14 (4th prtg. 1970).
3. See 1897 N.Y. LAws c. 412, art. 8, § 110.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.
6
Justice Holmes' deferential attitude toward state economic regu-
lation eventually won out. It is now widely (though not univer-
sally) accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
prohibit a state from intervening in the economy. State legisla-
tures (and Congress, to which the identically worded Fifth
Amendment applies) are free to regulate the economy provided
the means chosen are rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est. But while the Fourteenth Amendment may not enact Her-
bert Spencer's Social Statics,7 the recent Supreme Court decision
on sodomy, Lawrence v. Texas,8 shows that it all but enacts John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty.9 Justice Holmes, I suspect, would be
aghast.
Mill argued in On Liberty for what we might call classical lib-
eralism, which he thought could be summarized in "one very sim-
ple principle":
[T] he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individu-
ally or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number, is self-protection .... [T]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in
the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him,
or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct
from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to
produce evil to some one else. The only part of the con-
duct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over him-
self, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.10
6. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO
HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (1851).
8. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
9. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in 18 COLLECTED
WORS OFJOHN STUART MIL 213 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977).
10. Id. at 223-24.
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Mill was marking off a class of conduct (or a realm of life)
that was, morally speaking, beyond the reach of the state. In the
quoted passage, Mill identifies three grounds for limiting individ-
ual liberty:
1. (Prevention of) harm to others;
2. (Prevention of) harm to self; and
3. (Prevention of) harmless wrongdoing.
Elsewhere in On Liberty Mill discusses a fourth ground:
4. (Prevention of) offense to others.1'
Mill's claim is that only the first ground is legitimate. That is
to say, only the prevention of harm to others constitutes a good
reason to legally coerce or socially pressure individuals. The fact
that my action will harm me is morally irrelevant. The fact that
my action is immoral, or widely believed to be immoral, is irrele-
vant. The fact that my action may or will offend others is
irrelevant.
Mill was aware that more than one ground may apply to a
given act. Murder, for example, is both a harm to another (the
victim) and immoral. If it is done in public, moreover, it will
deeply offend (revolt, shock, dismay, frighten) onlookers. What
Mill argued is that only the harmfulness to others counts as a good
reason to prohibit and punish murder. The immorality does not.
The offensiveness does not. The harm or risk of harm to the
perpetrator (should there be any) does not. This is why I used
the expression "harmless wrongdoing" rather than merely
"wrongdoing." Mill was not opposed to legislating morality; he
was opposed to legislating morality when there is no victim. He
would have opposed what we now call victimless crimes (pro-
vided they really are victimless)."2
11. Id. at 283-85.
12. It is important not to conflate immorality and offensiveness, even if
some acts are both immoral and offensive. H.L.A. Hart explains the difference:
Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not immoral, but if it
takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. Homosexual
intercourse between consenting adults in private is immoral according
to conventional morality, but not an affront to public decency, though
it would be both if it took place in public. But the fact that the same
act, if done in public, could be regarded both as immoral and as an
affront to public decency must not blind us to the difference between
these two aspects of conduct and to the different principles on which
the justification of their punishment must rest. The recent English
law relating to prostitution attends to this difference. It has not made
prostitution a crime but punishes its public manifestation in order to
protect the ordinary citizen, who is an unwilling witness of it in the
streets, from something offensive.
H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MoRALrTY 45 (1963).
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The foremost contemporary defender of Millian liberalism
with respect to the moral limits of the criminal law is Joel Fein-
berg, who wrote a book on each of the four principles. 3 Fein-
berg called the principles "liberty-limiting principles," for each
states a distinct moral ground for limiting liberty. (According to
Feinberg, "Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs
some special justification. "114) There are other possible liberty-
limiting principles, as he acknowledged, but these four are the
main ones. For ease of reference, he gave them names. The
principle that there always exists a good reason for prohibiting
and punishing conduct that harms or risks harm to others is
called the "harm principle."' 5 The principle that there is always
a good reason for prohibiting and punishing conduct that seri-
ously offends others is called the "offense principle."' 6 The prin-
ciple that a good reason always exists for prohibiting and
punishing conduct that harms or risks harm to oneself is called
"legal paternalism."' 7 Finally, the principle that there is always a
good reason for prohibiting and punishing immoral conduct is
called "legal moralism.""i
The term "good reason" is important. Feinberg did not say
that preventing harm to others is a sufficient reason to limit lib-
erty, for it may be that certain harms are trivial (de minimis) in
comparison to the costs of enforcement (where intrusion on pri-
vacy is one significant cost).' 9 He was building an analytical
framework, inspired by Mill, for use in evaluating criminal laws.
He left the application of the various principles, as well as judg-
ments concerning enforcement and other costs, to legislators,
executives, and judges.20 Feinberg wrote as a philosopher, not a
policymaker.
13. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984-88).
Specifically, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986); 4JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988). For a bibliography of Fein-
berg's work, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, An Almost Complete Joel Feinberg
Bibliography, at http://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgessjackson/
Feinberg.htm (June 12, 2003) (on file with the Note Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
14. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO
OTHERS 9 (1984).
15. Id. at 10, 26-27.
16. Id. at 12-13, 26.
17. Id. at 12-13, 26-27.
18. Id. at 12-13, 27.
19. Id. at 189.
20. Id. at 190-92.
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Having identified and named the main liberty-limiting prin-
ciples, Feinberg went on to define "liberalism" in terms of them.
Liberalism, he said, is the view that only the harm and offense
principles, duly qualified, are valid.21 Extreme liberalism is the
view that only the harm principle is valid.22 This means that, to a
liberal (either kind), it is never a good reason (although it is
always a reason) to prohibit and punish conduct in order to pre-
vent harm to self or to prevent immoral conduct. Liberals are
not necessarily moral skeptics, subjectivists, or relativists (as is so
often charged). The reason a liberal rejects legal moralism is not
(necessarily) that morality is a myth (skepticism), a personal
stance (subjectivism), or an artifact (relativism), but that, even if
there are objective, universal moral values (truths), such values
(truths) are not a legitimate basis on which to limit individual
liberty. Law is one thing, the liberal insists, morality another.
Law must accommodate, on grounds of fairness, a diversity of
firmly held moral opinions, even if only one set of opinions is
objectively and universally "true."
When we superimpose Feinberg's analytical framework on
the passage from Mill, we see that Mill, too, rejects legal paternal-
ism and legal moralism. It's not as clear whether Mill would have
gone along with Feinberg in accepting a duly qualified offense
principle. In other words, it's not clear whether Mill was a liberal
(like Feinberg) or an extreme liberal; but he was some kind of
liberal. Another difference between Mill and Feinberg is that
Feinberg was concerned only with criminal punishment. (The
title of his tetralogy is The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.) Mill
was concerned with all forms of social pressure, not just legal
coercion. For example, Mill borrowed the expression "tyranny of
the majority" from Alexis de Tocqueville.2"
On June 26, 2003, in a case that will be discussed a hundred
years from now (Lawrence v. Texas 4), the United States Supreme
Court overruled its seventeen-year old decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.25 The overruling represents a movement to Millian liber-
alism, albeit without mentioning Mill or On Liberty. In Bowers, the
Court had applied traditional fundamental-rights analysis to a
Georgia statute that prohibited and punished sodomy (defined
as oral or anal intercourse).26 It first identified the interest at
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id.
23. MILL, supra note 9, at 219 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA
DEMOCRATIE EN AMPRIQUE 142 (2d ed. 1840)).
24. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
25. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
26. Id. at 190.
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stake. If state action (a statute, for example) implicates a "funda-
mental right," then the Court applies "strict scrutiny" to it. More
often than not, this results in a striking down of the statute. If no
fundamental right is implicated, then the Court applies "rational-
basis" analysis to it. This is an easy test to pass.
Obviously, a great deal hinges on whether a fundamental
right is implicated. The Bowers Court, via Justice Byron White,
held that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.27 (Yes, that is how the Court framed the issue. It is one
of many grounds on which Bowers has been criticized.) The only
remaining question was whether the state of Georgia had a
rational basis for its anti-sodomy law. The Court ruled that it did.
As Justice White put it, "The law . . . is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause [of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments], the courts will be very
busy indeed."28
This was a ringing endorsement of the legal enforcement of
morality, otherwise known as legal moralism.29 Justice White was
saying that the immorality of homosexual sodomy, or the pre-
sumed belief of a majority of the citizens of Georgia that homosex-
ual sodomy is immoral, is a good-indeed, a sufficient-reason,
constitutionally speaking, to prohibit and punish it. This should
not be read as a reflection of Justice White's personal views. For
all we know, he, like Justice Clarence Thomas in Lawrence, found
anti-sodomy laws "uncommonly silly."3° Indeed, Justice White
went out of his way to say, like Justice Holmes before him, that
the issue before the Court was not whether the Georgia statute
was "wise or desirable."'" That was for legislators to decide. The
issue was whether the United States Constitution forbids states to
enforce morality (or what they take to be morality).32 His answer
27. Id. at 191.
28. Id. at 196.
29. For a beautifully written and carefully reasoned defense of legal mor-
alism against several prominent liberal critics, see ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING
MEN MORAL: CRIIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993). George's "central
thesis" is that "there is nothing in principle unjust about the legal enforcement
of morals or the punishment of those who commit morals offenses." Id. at 1.
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (StewartJ., dissenting)).
31. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
32. Much has been written about the distinction between an act's being
immoral and its being widely or universally believed to be immoral. Ronald
Dworkin, for example, distinguishes between an "anthropological sense" of
morality and a "discriminatory sense" of morality, the former being purely
descriptive in nature (reflecting actual consensus, however uncritical, unrea-
2004]
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was that it did not.33 The Georgia statute was accordingly
upheld.34
Fast forward toJune 2003. The question before the Lawrence
Court was whether a state, such as Texas, may pass a law that
prohibits homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. The
Court could have upheld Bowers by striking down the Texas stat-
ute on Equal Protection grounds. The Court could have said, in
effect, that while no state may single out homosexual sodomy for
punishment, a state is free to prohibit and punish all sodomy.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had voted with the majority
in Bowers, took precisely this position in her concurring opin-
ion.35 Five other justices, however, decided to overrule Bowers.16
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the five-member Law-
rence majority. His opinion is remarkable for what it didn't do as
much as for what it did do. He did not use the traditional "fun-
damental-rights" analysis or the "privacy" rubric. He did not ask,
as Justice White had in 1986, whether there is a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy (indeed, Justice Kennedy
comes close to ridiculing that way of framing the issue). He did
not even ask whether there is a fundamental right to privacy that
includes or encompasses sodomy. He did not mention privacy at
all! Instead, he invoked a right to "liberty."" v Recall that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."3 The
soned, and unreflective) and the latter being critical, reasoned, and reflective.
He then criticizes Patrick Devlin for conflating the two senses. Dworkin's strat-
egy is interesting. He assumes legal moralism for the sake of argument (Dwor-
kin, like Mill and Feinberg, is a liberal) and shows that it does not support a
prohibition on homosexual conduct. "What is shocking and wrong," he writes,
"is not [Devlin's] idea that the community's morality counts, but his idea of
what counts as the community's morality." Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the
Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 1001 (1965-66) reprinted in RONALD
DWORXJN, TAKING RcRGHTS SERIOUSLY 248, 255 (1977).
33. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
34. In Justice Thomas's two-paragraph dissent in Lawrence, he wrote that
if he were a member of the Texas Legislature, he would "vote to repeal" the
anti-sodomy statute. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. It is a nice jurisprudential question whether the Court should have
overruled Bowers, or indeed whether its ruling really does overrule Bowers. There
is a longstanding principle, mentioned by justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion, that appellate cases should be decided on the narrowest possible
ground. The Court could (and arguably should) have struck down the Texas
statute without touching laws against sodomy generally. That it did not do so
raises the charge of judicial activism, of legislating rather than judging.
37. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 ("The liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.").
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Texas statute at issue in Lawrence does precisely that, Justice Ken-
nedy said. Hence, it violates the Constitution.
Although, as I said, Justice Kennedy made no mention of
Mill's On Liberty, its spirit pervades his opinion. For example, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he [anti-sodomy] statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law [via marriage, for instance], is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals."39 He then describes a "general rule" to the effect that
a state should not attempt "to define the meaning of the relation-
ship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects."4" This sounds suspiciously like the Mil-
lian harm principle.
But we saw that the harm principle is compatible with legal
moralism. As formulated, more than one of the four liberty-lim-
iting principles can be valid. This means that there can be more
than one ground for prohibiting and punishing a given act. If
Justice Kennedy's opinion is to be read as a Millian tract, there-
fore, he must foreswear legal moralism. In a remarkable para-
graph, he does just that, acknowledging that many people, past
and present, have condemned sodomy as immoral. "For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which
they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives."
41
But that, he says, is not the issue. "The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on
the whole society through operation of the criminal law."
4 2 The
clearly implied answer is "No."
Thus ends legal moralism as a constitutional principle. In
effect, Justice Kennedy and his colleagues in the majority read
the United States Constitution as rejecting legal moralism and
embracing, or at least moving toward, Millian liberalism. Hence-
forth, a criminal statute may not be justified as an enforcement
of morality (or of the widely held moral views of citizens). To
survive scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute that
limits individual liberty must be grounded in some other princi-
ple, such as the harm principle. It is not clear whether legal
paternalism remains a valid ground of criminal prohibition,
since that was not at issue in the case. But the clear movement is
toward Millian liberalism.
39. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2480.
42. Id.
20041
416 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
It would be a mistake to dismiss this result as academic-i.e.,
as being interesting but unimportant. As Justice Antonin Scalia
points out in his long, impassioned dissent in Lawrence,
"[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have
relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's
belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable'
constitutes a rational basis for regulation."4 If, as the Lawrence
majority says, the real or presumed immorality of conduct is no
longer reason to prohibit it, then laws against bigamy, same-sex
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, for-
nication, bestiality, and obscenity are called into question.4 4 Jus-
tice Scalia attempts to demonstrate the normative costs of the
Court's nascent Millianism. The problem with his demonstration
is that costworthiness is relative. To Justice Scalia and others, the
cost may be unbearable (i.e., not worth bearing). When he says
that Lawrence "effectively decrees the end of all morals legisla-
tion,"" he does so ruefully. But to liberals, some or all of the
laws Justice Scalia mentioned should be struck down as unconsti-
tutional. They are crimes (it is said) without a victim. Here we
have a stark difference in values. Justice Scalia's values lost.
It is interesting thatJustice Kennedy took pains to isolate the
issue under consideration by the Court.4 6 He said that the real
or presumed immorality of the conduct is irrelevant to the consti-
tutionality of the Texas statute. Constitutionally speaking, in
other words, the immorality of the conduct is not a good reason
to prohibit and punish it. But if it is not a good reason, then a
fortiori it is not a sufficient reason. Harm prevention and offense
prevention, however, are constitutionally relevant, so, to com-
plete his liberal analysis, Justice Kennedy needs to show that the
Texas statute (and others like it) cannot be justified by either the
harm principle or the offense principle. He does so as follows:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitu-
tion [which many people find seriously offensive and una-
voidable]. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship [such as
marriage] that homosexual persons seek to enter. The
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual con-
43. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2484.
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sent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common
to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their pri-
vate sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.... The Texas statute fur-
thers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual.
4 7
Neither Mill nor his champion, Feinberg, could have said it
better. The only question is whether Antonin Scalia will turn out
to be the twenty-first century's Oliver Wendell Holmes. Justice
Holmes's deferential attitude toward state economic regulation,
expressed in his Lochner dissent, took thirty-two years to emerge
victorious. Will Justice Scalia's deferential attitude toward state
social regulation, expressed in his Lawrence dissent, take thirty-two
years to emerge victorious? Will it ever emerge victorious? As is
so often the case in the law, only time will tell.
4"
47. Id.
48. Readers interested in the topic of legal moralism should consult
THOMAS C. GREv, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORAITv (1983) and MoPRALrv,
HARM, AND THE LAW (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994). Interestingly, Grey remarked
twenty years ago that "I t ]he Supreme Court itself has been less ready than have
academic commentators to read philosophical theories in general-or Mill's
principle in particular-into constitutional doctrine." GREY, supra, at 9. The
Court, it would appear, is now ready. Ours is quickly becoming, if it has not
already become, a Millian Constitution.
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